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NOT PENAL SUBSTITUTION  
BUT VICARIOUS PUNISHMENT
Mark C. Murphy
The penal substitution account of the Atonement fails for conceptual reasons: 
punishment is expressive action, condemning the party punished, and so is 
not transferable from a guilty to an innocent party. But there is a relative to 
the penal substitution view, the vicarious punishment account, that is neither 
conceptually nor morally objectionable. On this view, the guilty person’s 
punishment consists in the suffering of an innocent to whom he or she bears 
a special relationship. Sinful humanity is punished through the inglorious 
death of Jesus Christ; ill-desert is thus requited, and an obstacle to unity with 
God is overcome.
The doctrine of the Atonement raises a number of difficulties, and there is 
no reason to suppose that a theory of the Atonement organized around a 
single idea—ransom, or satisfaction, or penal substitution, or whatever—
will put paid to all of them. But it is nonetheless worthwhile to ask how 
much insight we can gain, and how many of our difficulties about the 
Atonement can be put to rest, with one or another of these ideas; and it is 
also worthwhile to ask to what extent a theory built around one of these 
ideas can incorporate the resources made available by the others.
Here I am going to argue for a vicarious punishment account of the 
Atonement, or, better, for an account of the Atonement that employs vi-
carious punishment as a central strand. I begin by criticizing the classic 
penal substitution view, showing that it is untenable not for moral but for 
conceptual reasons (section I). I then show how a vicarious punishment 
approach differs from a penal substitution approach, and thus is neither 
incoherent (section II) nor essentially morally objectionable (section III). 
With a defense of vicarious punishment in place, I employ that account 
to address some of the central difficulties regarding the Atonement 
(section IV). I then consider and solve a puzzle that arises within the 
vicarious punishment view (section V), and conclude by arguing that a 
vicarious punishment theory of the Atonement is fully compatible with, 
and indeed must be complemented by, an account of divine forgiveness 
(section VI).
I
The penal substitution theory of the Atonement holds that human beings, 
on account of their sins, deserve to be punished, but that Jesus Christ was 
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punished in our place, so that we no longer bear ill-desert.1 Some versions 
of the view hold that he was punished in the place of each and every hu-
man being; some hold that he was punished in the place only of those 
human beings that bear some special relationship to Christ.
An initial question that we might be puzzled by is why it should be an 
obstacle to human union with God, with our being at one with God, that 
we deserve to be punished for our sins. After all, it does not seem to be a 
particular obstacle to my union with my wife, or my children, that there 
are sins for which I deserve to be punished. I take it that the answer is that 
God is somehow—we need not pick a particular theory here—supposed 
to be the source of the law that we have violated and on account of which 
we bear ill-desert. So the mediating concept here is divine law. Because we 
bear ill-desert on account of our violations of the divine law, we cannot be 
at one with the source of that law until the ill-desert is removed. The penal 
substitution theory holds that this ill-desert is removed by punishment, 
and in particular, that Christ takes on this punishment for us, in our place. 
Christ is punished for our sins, and thus a necessary condition for unity 
with God is realized.2
The objections to the doctrine of penal substitution are familiar. On 
one hand, the objection is pressed that it is wrong to subject someone to 
hard treatment for the wrongs done by another. On the other hand, the 
objection is pressed that even if it were not morally abhorrent to punish 
someone for another’s wrongs, it would nevertheless constitute a failure 
with respect to punishment’s retributive aims if someone other than the 
evildoer were punished for the wrongful deed. Retribution, a legitimate 
and desirable aim of punishment, is unrealized if the wrongdoer is not 
him- or herself subjected to suffering on account of the wrongful deed; 
and a sinner’s ill-desert remains if he or she does not bear the punishment 
for his or her sin.3
1The penal substitution view, and the successor to it that I will defend, is thus 
to be distinguished from a satisfaction view of the sort defended classically by 
Anselm (Why God Became Man [Cur Deus Homo], trans. Joseph M. Colleran [Al-
bany: Magi Books, 1969]); and more recently by Richard Swinburne (Responsibility 
and Atonement [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989], pp. 148–162). The satisfac-
tion view connects the commission of sin to the generation of a debt to be repaid, 
and thus takes compensation as its guiding ideal; the penal substitution view con-
nects the commission of sin to the generation of moral culpability, and thus takes 
retribution as its guiding ideal.
2So, as Calvin writes, “In order that all ground of offence may be removed, and 
he may completely reconcile us to himself, he, by means of the expiation set forth 
in the death of Christ, abolishes all the evil that is in us, so that we, formerly im-
pure and unclean, now appear in his sight, just and holy. . . . Because the iniquity, 
which deserves the indignation of God, remains in us until the death of Christ 
comes to our aid, and that iniquity is in his sight accursed and condemned, we are 
not admitted to full and sure union with God, unless in so far as Christ unites us.” 
See the Institutes of the Christian Religion, trans. Henry Beveridge (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1997), II.xvi.3, p. 436. 
3I take for granted the value of retribution, thus providing ammunition for crit-
ics of penal substitution-type views (for they allege that retribution must be unre-
alized if guilty parties themselves do not bear the punishment for their offenses) 
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I will return to these moral objections in more detail later. For the mo-
ment I want to put them to the side in order to argue that the problem 
with penal substitution is not, first and foremost, a moral problem; it is, 
rather, a conceptual problem. The problem is not that penal substitution 
is immoral, but that it is conceptually defective. Once its incoherence is 
brought to light, it is plain that recent philosophical defenses of penal sub-
stitution by Steven Porter and David Lewis are failures.
What, after all, is punishment? It is, all agree, an authoritative imposi-
tion of hard treatment upon one for the failure to adhere to some binding 
standard.4 Punishment is hard treatment: it is, in itself, an evil, or perceived 
as an evil, by the person punished. Punishment is authoritative: it differs 
from vigilante justice or private revenge by its being imposed by someone 
who may legitimately impose such evils. Punishment is for a failure: one 
is subjected to punishment on account of something, in particular, on ac-
count of a failure to conform to some binding standard. No doubt one can 
ask questions about particular cases of punishment that fail to meet these 
conditions: perhaps the imposed punishment is not unwelcome by the 
punished, or is even a good; perhaps the party who imposes the punish-
ment is not authoritative but a pretender; perhaps the standard for which 
one is punished is not genuinely binding, but spurious. That is all fine. 
What is agreed is that each of these three conditions is characteristic of 
punishment, so that punishment is, or is believed to be in conformity with, 
or is put forward as satisfying, these conditions. When a case of punishing 
is put forward as meeting these conditions, but fails to meet them, or is 
believed to be in conformity with these conditions, but in fact is not, we 
thereby have a case of defective punishment.
But it is plain that these three conditions, while each necessary for 
punishment, are not jointly sufficient. For there are cases in which hard 
treatment is authoritatively imposed for a failure, but which are clearly 
not cases of punishment. The common law imposes an authoritative duty 
of care not to negligently impose losses on others; when one violates this 
and thereby causes a loss, one is subject to liability to pay compensation to 
the victim. This is hard treatment, authoritatively imposed, for the failure 
to meet a standard. But this is not punishment: we don’t call it punish-
ment, and it is a matter not of criminal law but of private law. The rules of 
basketball require one not to take more than one step while holding the 
basketball; when one violates the rule, one is subject to having the ball 
turned over to the opposing team by the referee. This is hard treatment, 
authoritatively imposed, for the failure to meet a standard. But basket-
ball games are not filled with punishments. Torts and penalties involve 
and for defenders of that view (for they hold that Christ’s suffering death is to be 
understood by reference to the value of retribution). If one simply rejects the value 
of retribution, the arguments of this paper will leave him or her cold. But the value 
of retribution is too large a subject to be dealt with here. For a very helpful account 
of the various ways to defend its value, see Michael S. Moore, “The Moral Worth of 
Retribution,” in Placing Blame (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), chap. 3.
4See, for a systematic account of the nature of punishment, Joel Feinberg, “The 
Expressive Function of Punishment,” in Doing and Deserving (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press 1970), pp. 95–118.
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authoritatively imposed hard treatment for failures to adhere to a stan-
dard, but they are not punishments.
What more, then, is necessary? Feinberg suggests, extremely plausibly, 
that a fourth condition concerns the function of punishment, or what we 
might better call its characteristic activity: punishment expresses condemna-
tion of the wrongdoer, of the wrongdoer as performer of the wrong.5 The 
hard treatment is the mode in which this condemnation is expressed.
There are a number of virtues to this suggestion. The first is that it carves 
the cases properly. Basketball penalties and tort awards do not typically 
involve expression of condemnation of the rule-violator, whereas criminal 
cases do typically involve such expression. (Defendants are found guilty 
of crimes; they are not found guilty in tort cases.) The second is that the 
hypothesis that punishment involves condemnation makes intelligible 
the fact that crimes have mens rea—guilty mind—conditions as essential 
elements. If one performs a criminal deed unknowingly, or without the 
requisite blameworthy volitional state (e.g., intentionally, or recklessly, or 
negligently), then no matter how harmful one’s deed, one has committed 
no crime.6 It also explains the role of affirmative defenses—excuses and 
justifications—in the criminal law. An excuse grants that one satisfies the 
elements of the crime, but holds that for whatever reason (insanity, im-
maturity, duress), one is not to blame—not worthy of condemnation. A 
justification grants that one satisfies the elements of the crime, but holds 
that circumstances were such that acting in a way that satisfied those ele-
ments was the right thing to do, and so one is not to blame—again, not 
worthy of condemnation.
But if this fourth condition is correctly formulated, then punishment 
expresses condemnation of the person punished. And if that is right, then 
punishment will be non-transferrable: one cannot express condemnation 
via hard treatment of someone who one does not take to be worthy of 
condemnation. Or, perhaps, one can, but then the punishing act will be 
defective—and it will not do for the penal substitution account to hold not 
merely that the penal substitution was unusual, or nonstandard (we all 
knew that already), but that it was a defective case of punishing.
Here is a similar case. When someone wins an athletic contest, there 
is often an official honoring of that person. One must do something else 
in order to honor the winner—honoring isn’t a basic action; it has to be 
done through some other action, say, by conferring a trophy, or by giving 
a ribbon, or just by declaring that the person is the victor. This honoring-
through-conferring-a-trophy (for example) may even be something that the 
5We should hold neither that punishment simply condemns the wrongdoer as 
such (after all, the wrongdoer may be admirable in lots of ways) nor that it simply 
condemns the wrongful act (after all, even basketball penalties recognize the act 
for which the penalty is imposed as a failure, which is a sort of condemnation; and 
what’s more, if punishment condemns only the act, it is hard to see why we are so 
set on ascertaining the precise identity of the wrongdoer if we already know that 
the act performed was a heinous one). The best way to characterize the condemna-
tion, then, is that it is of the wrongdoer in a certain respect, that is, as performer of 
the wrongful action.
6There are some crimes of strict liability for which no mental state is an essential 
element. But these are unusual, severe outliers in the criminal law.
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winner has a right to: if, to take the simplest case, it is part of what is under-
taken by the competitors and the officials that the winner will be honored 
with a trophy, then the failure to do this honor would be a violation of the 
winner’s rights, and something to which he or she could justly lay claim.
Now in 2005 Lance Armstrong won the Tour de France. No one other 
than Armstrong could be honored for Armstrong’s victory, through confer-
ring a trophy, giving a prize check, inscribing a name on a plaque. If they 
tried to honor Ullrich for Ullrich’s winning the 2005 Tour, they would have 
failed, because Ullrich did not win. If they tried to honor Ullrich for Arm-
strong’s winning the Tour, they would have failed, because to honor is to 
treat someone as praiseworthy in a certain particular respect, and Ullrich 
did not exhibit that praiseworthiness; Armstrong did. Now: Armstrong 
had a right to this honor, we may suppose. But the right is not transfer-
rable; even if Armstrong wished for Ullrich to be honored for Armstrong’s 
victory, Ullrich could not have been intelligibly so honored.7
Praise substitution and penal substitution are in the same boat. To 
praise and to punish are expressive actions, and they presuppose that 
their targets are bearers of certain relevant evaluative properties. Prais-
ing presupposes that the object of praise exhibits particular virtues; so, 
even if one has a right to be praised for something, that right cannot be 
transferred so that someone else is to be praised instead. Punishing pre-
supposes that the object of punishment has failed in particular respects; 
so, even if one (say, the victim, or some authority) has a right that someone 
be punished, that right cannot be transferred so that someone else is to be 
punished instead.
If (nondefective) punishment is essentially condemning of the agent who 
failed to live up to the standard the violation of which justifies the punish-
ment, then penal substitution is unintelligible. We know that attempts to 
justify it will founder not for moral reasons but for prior conceptual rea-
sons. Steven Porter’s recent attempt to defend penal substitution notes that 
penal substitution may very well not undercut some of the purposes for 
which punishments are imposed, e.g., deterrence.8 And that is of course 
correct: we cannot show that penal substitution must be objectionable be-
cause it will not meet any goal that punishment has been plausibly thought 
to serve. The objection will be to the very idea that punishing action can 
be intelligibly transferred from the characteristic target, the violator of the 
standard, to some other party. Porter makes his argument in terms of a 
retributive right—that the party who is wronged has the right to punish 
the offender, and so, if there is a transfer of that right that itself violates no 
parties’ rights, then penal substitution could be morally defensible.9 Now, 
I doubt that there is anything like a robust retributive right (as opposed 
7There are some cases, of course, when one wants to say that another person 
merits the honor that is being bestowed upon one—when someone else enabled 
the performance in one or another way, for example. Then one is claiming that 
honor bestowed solely on one is misplaced—the worthiness to be honored is al-
ready present in others. There is no transferring going on.
8Steven L. Porter, “Swinburnian Atonement and the Doctrine of Penal Substitu-
tion,” Faith and Philosophy 21 (2004), pp. 228–241.
9Ibid., pp. 234–237.
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to, say, a right to compensation), but put that worry to the side for the mo-
ment. Nor do I think that, once the intelligibility of the transfer is granted, 
there is a problem describing a scenario in which no parties’ rights are 
violated by such a transfer. The problem is that the transfer itself makes 
no sense, in the same way that Armstrong’s transferring the right to be 
honored for winning the 2005 Tour de France makes no sense. No one can 
honor Ullrich for Ullrich’s winning it, as he didn’t. No one can honor Ull-
rich for Armstrong’s winning it, as one can be honored only for one’s own 
merits. Similarly, even if I have a right to punish you on account of your 
wronging me, this right would be nontransferable—not because it is in the 
classic sense ‘inalienable’ (i.e., that the right concerns such an important 
human good that no attempt to transfer it can be successful) but because 
any hard treatment that I took myself to have the right to impose on some-
one else as a result of this transfer would not be punishment at all.10
Lewis’s qualified defense of penal substitution focuses on fines,11 and 
he places a great deal of weight on the fact that we seem very tolerant of 
people who are punished by the imposition of a fine having that fine paid 
by someone else.12 While I think that his arguments require multiple lines 
of response, the emphasis on the condemning character of punishment is 
also relevant here. It is important to keep in mind that penal substitution is 
not supposed to eliminate punishment, but rather to re-direct it. But in cases 
in which someone pays another’s fine, the only ways to describe the situa-
tion coherently are either (a) that the criminal is punished, but painlessly, 
or (b) that no one ends up being punished. We could say, following (a), that 
10Porter responds to a version of this conceptual objection, in particular to Quin-
ton’s version of it, by noting that it is logically possible to punish people who are in 
fact innocent, and he infers from this that the objection to penal substitution must 
be moral rather than conceptual (Ibid., p. 236). This response fails. There can still 
be conceptual incoherence even when there is no logical inconsistency—take, for 
example, the Moorean paradox of asserting “I believe that p, but p is false,” which 
is an incoherent assertion though it is logically consistent that one believe that p 
though not-p is true. But that is just the sort of incoherence that has to be present 
in penal substitution: that one who is doing the punishing is committed to holding 
that A is innocent but worthy of condemnation.
11David Lewis, “Do We Believe in Penal Substitution?,” in Papers in ethics and 
social Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 128–135.
12Lewis thinks that, even when the possibility of others’ paying one’s fines is 
made very plain, folks will still not be significantly worried about the practice 
(Ibid., p. 133). For one counterexample, witness the following letter to the edi-
tor from the new York times: “A Magistrate complained the other day—and the 
same complaint comes from Philadelphia also—of the defiant demeanor of some 
of the shirtwaist strikers arraigned before him, ascribing it to the fact that people 
of wealth were paying the offenders’ fines. If this is the case, the Magistrates have 
only themselves to blame, for, as a fine is imposed as punishment, to permit an 
intervenor to assume the penalty by paying the fine is to remit the punishment on 
the part of the offender and defeat the purpose intended to be achieved. . . . This 
proceeding would be justifiable only if the sum were assessed as to the satisfaction 
of a debt or the reparation of an injury, which of course it is not. The vicarious pay-
ing of fines is farcical, if not unlawful, and it would seem to be the duty of Mag-
istrates to make an end of it” (“Vicarious Punishment: Purpose of Law Defeated 
Where Rich Women Pay Fines of Strikers,” new York times, January 19, 1910).
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what happens when someone pays another’s fine is that the terms of the 
punishment require that the criminal be responsible for seeing to the out-
come that the state be paid a certain sum of money; when one’s rich rela-
tive pays the fine for one, the punishment is carried out, but without any 
difficulty for the criminal. Or we could say, following (b), that what hap-
pens is that the person fined is not punished, as the rich relative pays the 
required amount, and so there is no requisite hard treatment; the person 
who actually pays the fine is of course not punished, as there is no sense 
in which he or she is condemned for the wrongful deed for which the fine 
must be paid. In the former case, there is punishment, though we would be 
inclined to think it defective because the hard treatment wasn’t so hard; in 
the latter case, there is no punishment at all, for the payment of the fine by 
the outside party resulted in there being no one over whom the conditions 
of punishment were all satisfied—we have a case of what we might call 
‘penal nullification.’ But in neither of these cases is penal substitution going 
on. Since it is essential to the classic penal substitution view that there be 
punishment taking place and that there be substitution taking place, Lewis 
does not offer a successful defense of penal substitution.
I have focused my criticisms on this formulation of the penal substitu-
tion view because it has an air of intelligibility about it—one can see why 
bearing ill-desert under divine law would block unity with God, and thus 
why a transfer of punishment from humanity to Christ would overcome 
this obstacle. No doubt there are other views that one might classify as ‘pe-
nal substitution’ views, though, that are not subject to the objections that I 
have leveled against the view that Christ was punished for our sins. One 
might claim, for example, that somehow our sins became Christ’s sins, so 
that Christ can be properly condemned, and thus there is no incoherence 
in punishing Christ in our place. Or one might claim that one is not pun-
ished for having done evil deeds but for the resultant guilt, and this guilt 
is something transferable, and it has in fact been transferred from sinful 
humanity to Christ. Of course I will object to each of these. With respect to 
the former, while we might have some experience of one person’s sins re-
ally belonging to another (e.g., in cases in which parents raise children to 
be vicious), we have no such experience of transfer of moral responsibility 
for actions; so while we can use the words ‘our sins became Christ’s sins,’ 
this sheds no light on how our ill-desert is relieved by Christ’s suffering 
death.13 With respect to the latter, again, we have no experience of guilt 
as such, cut off from its sources; one is always guilty for something done 
or undone, or some state of affairs realized or unrealized. We can use the 
words ‘the guilt itself is transferred,’ but again this will shed no light.
Now one may complain that I have given these alternative formula-
tions of penal substitution short shrift. But I do not think that it can be 
denied that what these alternative formulations are calling for is a radical 
13We need to be careful here. The fact that, upon coming to know of the hor-
rifying condition of a criminal’s upbringing, we might come to judge the parents 
rather than the child to be blameworthy does not count as a transfer of moral 
responsibility in the relevant sense. This change is merely epistemic: we thought 
that the child was blameworthy, but it turned out the parents were. What penal 
substitution requires is not a shift in our judgment but a normative shift with re-
spect to who in fact merits punishment.
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transformation of our ordinary concepts of guilt, responsibility, and pun-
ishment, and if the aim is to make the Atonement intelligible, it is far from 
clear that such radical transformations can serve that purpose. If there 
were an account of the Atonement that captures some of the central ideas 
of the penal substitution view—that Christ’s suffering death is meant to 
rid us of our ill-desert, inflicting a punishment that is a necessary prepara-
tion for union with God—and that did not involve such conceptual inno-
vation, then that view would merit serious attention from those inclined 
toward a penal substitution view. And that is just what I claim on behalf 
of the account of the Atonement that I am defending.
II
The classic penal substitution view of the Atonement is incoherent. But 
there is a nearby theory of the Atonement that is not. (Indeed, I would not 
be surprised if some of those who take themselves to be inclined to defend 
a penal substitution view are instead inclined to defend some version of 
this near relative.) What is supposed to happen in cases of penal substitu-
tion is this. A deserves to be punished; but B is punished in A’s place; and 
so A no longer deserves to be punished. A’s ill-desert is removed by B’s pe-
nally substituting for A. This, however, is incoherent (section I). Consider, 
by contrast, vicarious punishment. A deserves to be punished; B undergoes 
hard treatment, which hard treatment constitutes A’s being punished; and 
so A no longer deserves to be punished.
The crucial difference between the cases of vicarious punishment and 
penal substitution is that in vicarious punishment, the wrongdoer is the 
one punished by having hard treatment imposed on him or her; there is no 
suggestion of penal substitution. What is the same is that in both vicarious 
punishment and penal substitution some other party’s being subjected to 
hard treatment is what constitutes the punishing and thereby allows for 
the requital of ill-desert.
It is plain that the conceptual incoherence present in the classic penal 
substitution view is not present in vicarious punishment, for on vicarious 
punishment the bearers of ill-desert are the ones who are condemned by 
hard treatment for their sins. The proof that this conceptual incoherence 
is absent is that we can give examples of vicarious punishment that both 
seem to be clear cases of punishment and which satisfy all of the criteria 
for punishment that we have made explicit. Suppose that under a legal 
system one who murders someone who is married is to be punished, 
if possible, by having one’s own spouse killed. The idea is not that the 
spouse is being punished in one’s place, a la penal substitution. Rather, 
the idea is that the criminal is punished by having his or her spouse killed. 
Think of it this way: One way that one can undergo hard treatment is to 
be deprived of one’s life. Another is to be deprived of one’s liberty, or one’s 
bodily integrity, or one’s property. We may call all of these ‘punishments in 
propria persona,’ for they are applied immediately to one’s own person. But 
not all punishments must be in propria persona. For surely one way that one 
can suffer hard treatment is for someone whom one loves to be made to 
suffer. If one’s good can, through special relationships with others, come 
to include these others’ good, then one can be made worse off by another 
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person’s being made worse off. Indeed, the hard treatment imposed by 
vicarious punishment is even worse than the simple fact that one’s loved 
one (e.g.) is suffering; it is that one’s loved one is suffering because of one’s 
wrongful action. So there seems to be nothing that bars a vicarious punish-
ment from meeting the hard treatment condition.
And clearly the other explicit conditions for punishment may be satis-
fied here as well. In the case I described, that the punishment for one 
who murders a married person is to have one’s own spouse killed is a 
part of the legal code, and so it is authoritatively imposed in the way that 
other legal punishments are authoritatively imposed. The hard treatment 
is imposed only for the failure to adhere to the legal duty not to murder. 
And it seems plain enough that such hard treatment can be essentially 
condemning—part of the criminal code, and limited by the variety of 
negative and affirmative defenses that block attributions of blameworthi-
ness and so make condemnation inappropriate. Vicarious punishment is, 
then, genuine punishment. There is no conceptual obstacle to it. Indeed, 
one can not only imagine instances of vicarious punishment; one can 
imagine a whole criminal code built on vicarious punishment, in which 
the central mode of punishing legal wrongdoing is by imposing hard 
treatment on the wrongdoer not in propria persona but rather through 
someone whose good is characteristically wrapped up with the good of 
the wrongdoer.
III
Vicarious punishment, unlike penal substitution, is not conceptually con-
fused. But it may nevertheless be thought to be too morally objectionable 
to be worth bothering with. I will offer, then, a limited defense of the prac-
tice of vicarious punishment before turning specially to vicarious punish-
ment and the Atonement.
vicarious punishment and injustice. Vicarious punishment involves the 
subjection of an innocent party to suffering—I will call this party the ‘suf-
fering innocent’—in order to punish a guilty one. This it has in common 
with the penal substitution view, and it may simply be thought to be 
grossly unjust that an innocent would have to suffer because of someone 
else’s wrong.
My answer to the charge that vicarious punishment is unjust is a simple 
one. It is possible for there to be a scheme of vicarious punishment to 
which all of the potential suffering innocents freely and informedly con-
sent. A practice by which one party subjects another to some deprivation 
may no doubt be morally objectionable even if the parties involved freely 
and informedly consent, but the species of wrongness will not be that of 
injustice; volenti non fit iniuria. If the state, or whatever form of legal au-
thority is in place, has instituted and is employing vicarious punishment 
for some crimes, the consent of all potential suffering innocents is suf-
ficient to preclude the charge that if someone is made to suffer in order to 
punish a wrongdoer, then he or she is being treated unjustly.
One would not argue, I take it, that one should not undertake, and 
would not be bound by, agreements to undergo some deprivation of 
goods, at least if those agreements are made for a sufficiently worthwhile 
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purpose. Suppose, for example, that I have made an agreement with the 
state. In order to test the effects of limits to one’s freedom, I agree to stay 
within a certain relatively small geographical area over a certain period 
of time, to honor constraints on my freedom of movement imposed by 
others, and so forth. Suppose that I indeed enter this agreement with full 
awareness and freedom, and later decide to refuse to honor it. It seems a 
very contentious claim that the state in no cases could require specific per-
formance from me, especially if the state could not easily carry out its rea-
sonable and important goals without my performance. But here we have 
a case in which I am, though not a wrongdoer, made to suffer, confined, 
deprived of an important set of human goods. What makes this legitimate 
is my free and informed agreement, and this seems to remove a basis for 
claiming that requiring compliance is itself unjust. If, then, retribution is 
itself a sufficiently worthwhile purpose, then there seems to be reason to 
suppose that one’s agreement to be subject to becoming a suffering in-
nocent in order to realize the ends of retribution would be sufficient to 
undercut the charge of injustice.
Two concessions. I concede that there may be some other sort of moral 
wrong here. Perhaps one might claim that it is cruel to do this. But claims 
of cruelty seem—when not backed up by a claim of injustice—to be rather 
global in their criteria of application: if an action is purported to be cruel 
(though not unjust), we would have to ask whether the action is justified 
by the ends the action pursues and the circumstances in which it is per-
formed. So one might, I concede, sensibly say that while it is not unjust, 
vicarious punishment is cruel, because the ends of punishment can be re-
alized using nothing but punishment in propria persona, without subjecting 
people to the possibility of becoming suffering innocents. We will have to 
ask, then, whether there might be adequate reasons to employ vicarious 
punishment rather than exclusively punishment in propria persona.
I also concede that it is possible that there is inevitably some injustice 
generated by schemes of vicarious punishment. It is not injustice between 
the legal authorities and the person who is made to suffer on account of 
someone else’s wrongdoing; the consent I have imagined precludes that 
charge. If there is any injustice, it is between the wrongdoer and the suffer-
ing innocent. If a scheme of vicarious punishment has me slated to suffer 
if you commit a crime, in order to punish you (you love me), and you 
commit a crime, then you have likely done me an injustice. But this can-
not be a criticism of the vicarious punishment scheme, or else it cannot 
be a serious one. For punishment schemes quite generally have the result 
that one who commits a crime and is subjected to punishment does an 
injustice to those with whom he or she has a special relationship.14 If you 
and I love each other, and I commit a crime and am punished, I make you 
worse off through my having hard treatment imposed on me. I think that 
this counts as my doing you an injustice: you deserve not to suffer this, yet 
you do, because I acted wrongly. (This is not to mention the other more 
mundane sufferings loved ones can undergo when criminals have their 
lives, liberty, or wealth taken in punishment.)
14This will be an important challenge to the vicarious punishment account of 
the Atonement I defend; see section V.
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vicarious punishment and the legitimate aims of punishment. Even if vicari-
ous punishment need not do any injustice, it might still be criticized as in-
evitably failing to realize the legitimate goals of punishment. But the case 
for this seems weak. The typical aims of punishment in terms of which it 
is justified are retribution and deterrence. Retribution is realized by de-
priving the wrongdoer of a significant human good. Deterrence functions 
by motivating people to be less inclined to commit a crime because of the 
likelihood of what is perceived to be an unhappy consequence of doing 
so. But there is no reason on the face of it that vicarious punishment could 
not be effective with respect to retribution or deterrence. If retribution is 
realized through the deprivation of a human good, and the human good 
is in part constituted by the good of those with whom one stands in some 
special relationship, then retribution can be realized through vicarious 
punishment. As for deterrence, it is obvious that humans can be deterred 
by the prospect of the suffering of those close to them, and it is an empiri-
cal matter how extensive such motivation is.15
the point of using vicarious punishment. But isn’t it pointless to use vi-
carious punishment, when the dominant aims of punishment can be re-
alized by inflicting harm simply on the wrongdoer rather than through 
the sufferings of another? Doesn’t this add needless cruelty to the act of 
punishing—bringing in two parties to suffer, one of whom is subjected 
to suffering without guilt, and generating needless anxiety in all those 
who may become suffering innocents? Doesn’t the practice of punishment 
already have enough to worry about?
I do not need to argue that vicarious punishment is a generally good 
idea for legal systems to adopt. It is, generally, a terrible idea. Consent to 
such a scheme could probably not be freely and informedly acquired, and 
no doubt there would likely be so much anxiety about it that vicarious 
punishment would be an unpalatable option. Those who are disposed to 
rid themselves of certain persons to whom they bear a special relationship 
would be given perverse incentives to violate the law.16 But it is neverthe-
less worth focusing on what there could be to say in favor of vicarious 
punishment over punishment in propria persona in certain cases, since, af-
ter all, the aim of this article is not to defend vicarious punishment gener-
ally but in the special case of the Atonement.
If there are cases in which vicarious punishment is justified, it is be-
cause through vicarious punishment the aims of punishment can be bet-
ter served than through a scheme in which all punishment is in propria 
persona or there are distinct, further purposes that vicarious punishment 
can incorporate that punishment in propria persona cannot. Begin with the 
aims of punishment. In the previous subsection I argued that vicarious 
15I of course have no interest in denying that there could be other accounts of 
punishment for which vicarious punishment cannot serve. A theory of punishment 
that holds that punishment is permissible only if it places the wrongdoer under the 
immediate control of the state (for example, by execution, or by imprisonment)—
imagine a theory of punishment in which incapacitation is the primary justifying 
aim—will have no use for vicarious punishment.
16Note that there are situations in which considerations of these sorts would 
also make a scheme of in propria persona punishment morally unpalatable.
264 Faith and Philosophy
punishment can serve the aims of retribution and deterrence. One might 
argue, then, that vicarious punishment might be justified if the aims of 
retribution and / or deterrence are better realized under vicarious punish-
ment than under some other scheme.
With respect to retribution, it may well be that a way to make the suf-
fering of a wrongdoer better answered, retributively speaking, is to pun-
ish him or her vicariously. If I were to do something horrible, for which 
retribution was called for, it may be that my imprisonment would not 
be as bad for me as would be my wife’s, or my daughter’s, imprison-
ment. If we think, as retributivists do think, that the gravity of wrongdo-
ing should be answered by a correspondingly severe punishment, then 
a particularly grave wrongdoing by me might be better answered by 
punishing me through harm to a loved one than through unmediated 
punishing of me.
One might respond that even if that is true, this is not the crucial com-
parison to make. One might ask why we would not simply ratchet up the 
hard treatment of the wrongdoer directly, rather than turn to vicarious 
punishment. No doubt this is a feasible alternative in many cases. But 
there may be various limits to this strategy that might be overcome by 
way of vicarious punishment. I want to focus on a particular one here. 
It may be that retribution requires, or requires for its nondefective ap-
plication, that the person punished be able to receive that punishment as 
an agent—with clear understanding, full capacity to respond rationally, 
and so forth. And there may be punishments that are so psychologically 
destabilizing, so undermining of our capacities to respond as agents, that 
they are inappropriate forms of retribution. (I am thinking of certain sorts 
of torture, in particular.) Vicarious punishment might make possible ad-
equate, or more adequate, retribution by allowing the person punished 
to be able to endure the punishment as an agent though its severity is 
extraordinarily increased.
Consider next deterrence. At least in my own case, if introspection is 
at all reliable here, I would be more motivated by that deprivation’s being 
imposed on one of my children than by that deprivation’s being imposed 
on me. I do not think that I am particularly virtuous; this seems like the 
normal motivational state for humans with respect to their children. So it 
may well be that a scheme of vicarious punishment, at least for some of-
fenses, would be a superior deterrent.
There may be other reasons for employing vicarious punishment, rea-
sons that are not restricted to achieving the aims of punishment more 
adequately. To adapt an example of Porter’s, consider an athletic team’s 
captain being made to suffer (run laps, do pushups, etc.) in order to pun-
ish the whole team for their blameworthy infractions.17 Assuming the 
justification of the punishing of the team, it might have served the legiti-
mate ‘internal’ aims of punishment just as well for the coaches to have the 
whole team run some laps. But there is a good of unity that is being sought 
here. When everyone runs, the focus is on one’s own discomfort, one’s 
17Porter, “Swinburnian Atonement,” p. 236. Porter’s case involves a single late 
player rather than the whole team, but he appeals to the good of unity realized 
through having the captain suffer the consequences.
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own pain. When the captain runs, there is a common focus, on the suffer-
ing of the one. So vicarious punishment might be chosen reasonably here 
for the sake of unity among those who are to be punished, if that unity is 
itself a worthwhile good. Or, with respect to deterrence, not all equally 
deterring deterrents are created equal with respect to their value. Some 
deterrents might, for example, reinforce morally valuable traits more suc-
cessfully than others. So one might claim that it is better to be deterred by 
the prospect of a harm that is immediately inflicted on others rather than 
immediately inflicted on oneself; the former, but not the latter, reinforces 
altruistic modes of thinking and acting, and so is superior in that respect.
Iv
The pieces are now in place of a theory of the Atonement that appeals to vi-
carious punishment—not, I think, as the sole gloss on that doctrine, but as 
contributing importantly to a full explanation. The view is simple to state. 
We human beings have sinned, have violated the divine law, in egregious 
ways. We thus merit punishment; and until this ill-desert is requited, there 
is an obstacle to proper union with God. In order to exact retribution and 
requite this ill-desert, God chose to punish us vicariously. Because Christ 
accepted this scheme freely, and with awareness that he would indeed be 
called upon to undergo the suffering constitutive of the punishment, it 
does Jesus neither injustice nor cruelty that he was to suffer in the carrying 
out the punishment on sinful humanity.18 So, on this view, the way that 
each of us is punished for our transgressions of divine law is that his or her 
lord is killed. Each of us, for his or her sins, is subjected to the hard treat-
ment of having his or her Lord made to suffer and die. What makes this 
hard treatment imposed on us sinners is that the relationship of being lord 
of is a special relationship that makes the misfortunes of the Lord constitu-
tive of bad for the subject. This is very hard treatment indeed.19
18As I noted above (section II), this is not to deny that there may be some injus-
tice present in Christ’s having to suffer that we might be adequately punished. I 
consider some difficulties raised by this below (section V).
19I do not plan to defend here one of the two possible interpretations of being 
in this special relationship to Christ such that one can be vicariously punished 
through Christ’s suffering. On one reading, Christ’s being my Lord is a special 
relationship that is contingent—even given Christ’s life, death, and resurrection, 
Christ might failed to have been my Lord in the sense relevant to the vicarious pun-
ishment account. On this view, it is only those who enter into a special relationship 
with Christ whose sins are vicariously punished through Christ’s suffering; those 
who do not enter into that relationship are such that their ill-desert remains, as yet 
unpunished. On another reading, Christ’s being my Lord is a special relationship 
that is, given Christ’s life, death, and resurrection, necessary—Christ is my Lord, 
and every other human’s Lord, in the relevant sense. My sins have been punished 
through Christ’s suffering, even though I might not even realize it yet. (This is not 
absurd. One can recognize only later that one was badly-off in a certain respect—
for example, one who comes to recognize the value of family only halfway through 
a prison term will realize that, all along, he was being subjected to hard treatment 
by being deprived of free access to members of his family.) I will not enter into this 
issue here, because I do not think that the issue of whether a vicarious punishment 
account of the Atonement can be made to work turns on it; this is a general ques-
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Why affirm this view? First: the vicarious punishment account has an 
answer to the question, forcefully pressed by Porter in his defense of pe-
nal substitution: Why did Christ’s mission involve his horrible, inglorious 
death?20 The vicarious punishment view has a straightforward answer. It is 
crucial to our being subjected to hard treatment that someone in a special 
relationship to us—our Lord—be deprived of these central human goods.
Second: much of the Scriptural basis for penal substitution is also avail-
able for the vicarious punishment account—though, as I have argued, the 
vicarious punishment account is at least an eligible theory of the Atone-
ment, whereas the penal substitution view is conceptually incoherent. If 
one takes seriously the view that the Scriptural basis points toward some-
thing like a penal substitution account as being at least part of the story 
of the Atonement, then one should be inclined to look favorably on the 
vicarious punishment account. With respect to those passages that em-
phasize that Christ’s saving us from sin happens through Christ’s death,21 
it is clear that the vicarious punishment view succeeds as well as the penal 
substitution view on this score. Further: the vicarious punishment account 
captures as well as the penal substitution view the scriptural suggestions 
that Christ bore our sufferings for us, making it possible that we be rec-
onciled to God. I cannot deny, of course, that there are texts that suggest 
that Christ was literally punished: that he was chastised,22 or made sin,23 
or cursed.24 But we have independent reason to think that this language 
cannot be meant literally (see the end of section II), and such formulations 
would seem to be poetically apt characterizations of vicarious punishment 
through Christ’s sacrificial death.25
Third: The vicarious punishment view puts paid to the notion that by 
Christ’s dying for our sins, we are thereby getting away with something. 
We are, rather, being punished for our sins, and indeed, worse than we 
would be punished if we ourselves died for them.
We can see some of the point of vicarious punishment through Christ’s 
death for our sins by reflecting again on retribution and deterrence. I 
said above (section III) that in assessing the point of employing vicarious 
punishment, we should begin by asking whether the aims of punishment 
might well be better achieved if, in some case, vicarious punishment were 
employed. Begin with retribution. First, in terms of hard treatment, it is 
worse for me to have my son or daughter killed, and killed for my offenses, 
than it is for me to be killed, and killed for my offenses. But should we 
tion to be posed of any theory of the Atonement (ransom, satisfaction, and even 
exemplarist accounts admit of both interpretations).
20Porter, “Swinburnian Atonement,” p. 232.
21See, e.g., Isaiah 53; Romans 5:10; Galatians 3:13.
22Isaiah 53:5.
232 Corinthians 5:21.
24Galatians 3:13.
25On the vicarious punishment view, Christ was pierced for our offenses; he 
was crushed for our sins; he was smitten by God and afflicted; by his stripes we 
were healed. But I think it would be conceptually confused to say that Jesus was 
literally chastised—not by God, anyway.
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not also say, a fortiori, that it is worse, incomparably so, for my Lord to 
be killed, and killed for my offenses, than it is for me to be killed for my 
offenses? Now, as I noted, one might say that there is always the possibil-
ity of ratcheting up the punishment of me in my proper person rather 
than carrying the punishment out vicariously through the sufferings of 
Christ. But, first, I am not confident that we know any such thing, when 
we reflect on how bad it is, not just impersonally, but for one, that one’s 
Lord has been ingloriously killed, and ingloriously killed because of one’s 
transgressions.26 And, second, it may be that the sort of hard treatment 
that would be required if we were to ratchet up the deprivation in propria 
persona would be undermining of retributive aims—it might make one 
psychologically incapable of acting as an agent, and so vicarious punish-
ment might be needed in order to have the appropriate level of depriva-
tion along with the appropriate capacities as an agent.27 Third, there may 
be other reasons for carrying out the punishment vicariously. Recall the 
variation on Porter’s case, in which an athletic team’s captain suffers on 
behalf of the whole team for their blameworthy failures. There is a good 
of unity realized when the punishment is a common deprivation—our 
captain is suffering out there, and because of what we did constitutes an evil, 
we can suppose, for each and every team member. So, too, independently 
of the question of the relative merits of vicarious and in propria persona 
punishment for achieving the internal aims of punishment, there may be 
other reasons for employing vicarious punishment—for example, this aim 
of unity. We humans, or we Christians, are unified through the fact that 
our punishment is through the suffering of our Lord, Jesus Christ.28
26It may be that the answer to the question of whether the punishments that 
God could inflict on us in propria persona are more, less, or equally severe to the 
punishment that God imposes on us vicariously through Christ’s death is: None of 
the above. For there may be distinct and incommensurable aspects of the severity 
of a punishment. So one might hold that in propria persona punishments are, as a 
class, worse than vicarious punishments in that they are borne immediately by 
one’s natural person; vicarious punishments can be worse in that they can involve 
the suffering of one who less merits suffering, or whose well-being holds a more 
central place in the constitution of one’s good, and so forth. 
27This is one worry about how we characterize hell. If we take hell to be a place 
of retribution, the badness of it must be limited by the preservation of the capacity 
of the punished to respond to it as such.
28I claimed above (n. 19) that the vicarious punishment view is neutral with re-
spect to the sort of special relationship with Christ that makes it possible for Christ’s 
death to constitute our being punished. But one might nevertheless worry about 
whether my neutrality sits well with the fact that there are some humans who do 
not recognize Christ as Lord and thus who are utterly indifferent to Christ’s suffer-
ing; such persons are neither punished, nor unified with others, through Christ’s 
death. Perhaps this is the sort of consideration that should lead one to a specific 
view of the class of persons who are vicariously punished through Christ’s death. 
But I am not totally moved by this point. If one believes that what is good and bad 
for one is not fundamentally a matter of what enters into one’s experience, then 
it is possible for one to be punished without recognizing what one is receiving as 
hard treatment. And if one believes that there are important forms of unity with 
others that one can have without realizing it, then perhaps even unbelievers who 
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Now, while deterrence might play an important role in defending use 
of vicarious punishment within human legal systems, it has not played 
an important role in penal substitution accounts of the Atonement; what 
has mattered there has been retribution. But one might well appeal to 
deterrence in a vicarious punishment account of the Atonement.29 Pun-
ishment, one might say, not only releases one from ill-desert; it can deter 
one from acquiring that ill-desert in the first place. One might doubt that 
this point could be brought to bear in a vicarious punishment theory of 
the Atonement. For one might point out that in my earlier defense of vi-
carious punishment as a deterrent (section III), the vicarious punishment 
to be avoided was in the future, and the deterrent mechanism was that 
one might be able to prevent that punishment by avoiding the wrongful 
conduct. But that of course is not at issue here: for us, Christ’s death is 
past, and we cannot bring it about that it is not the case that our Lord 
has been ingloriously killed. But it would be too quick to reject vicarious 
punishment as deterrent in this case. For part of what makes for the bad-
ness of one’s condition when vicarious punishment is carried out is that 
what is endured by the suffering innocent is present on account of one’s 
own wrongdoing. But this is relevant to the deterrent value of Christ’s in-
glorious death. For suppose that I am tempted to violate divine law and 
thus incur ill-desert. If I perform the action, it will be true that Christ’s 
death occurred in order that I might be adequately punished for that wrong-
doing. And this is the sort of fact that can be motivating, and which can 
help to deter one from acting wrongly. Indeed, this is the sort of de-
terrence made possible through vicarious punishment that may well be 
more morally uplifting than that which involves punishments inflicted 
simply in propria persona. For in the latter case one continues to focus 
on oneself, on one’s own proper well-being. In the former case, what is 
the primary object of concern is the suffering innocent; one’s focus is on 
someone else, and the deprivations that he or she suffers on account of 
one’s acting wrongly.30
I have claimed that a vicarious punishment view avoids the difficulties 
of a penal substitution position while exhibiting its virtues. But a defender 
of a classic penal substitution view may claim that, regardless of whatever 
success my earlier arguments may have, it must be allowed that the move 
from penal substitution to vicarious punishment involves an important 
loss. On the penal substitution view, the notion that Christ is punished 
for our sins explains why we ought to have such gratitude to Christ for 
his undergoing this suffering: Christ was punished so that we did not 
have to be. On the vicarious punishment view, on the other hand, Christ 
would deny such unity are unified with believers through being freed of their ill-
desert through vicarious punishment.
29I am not perfectly at ease with deterrence as a justifying aim of punishment. 
But as my discomfort with appeals to deterrence to justify punishment is not gen-
erally shared, it is worth asking whether, granting its legitimacy as a justifying aim, 
deterrence could play a role in a vicarious punishment account of the Atonement.
30The vicarious punishment account can, then, appropriate some of the value of 
the exemplarist theory of the Atonement by noting how vicarious punishment can 
serve to improve the character of those who reflect upon Christ’s sacrifice.
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was made to suffer so that we would be punished. Our punishment is not 
remitted, but imposed, though vicariously. And one might justly wonder 
whether a view that detracts from the gratitude that we owe to Jesus for 
his sacrifice could be a defensible view.
I think this objection fails. For first, and in my view most importantly, 
on both the penal substitution and the vicarious punishment accounts it 
is crucial to our well-being that our ill-desert is removed. On the vicari-
ous punishment view, what makes possible the removal of our ill-desert is 
being punished through Christ’s death. So even though we are punished, 
we have reason to be grateful to Christ for eliminating an obstacle—ill-
desert—that stands between our sinful selves and full union with God. Sec-
ond, even the penal substitution defender should allow that Christ’s being 
punished makes it the case that we suffer: for, after all, that it is bad for one 
that one’s Lord suffers, and suffers on account of one’s wrongdoing, should 
not be what is at issue between the penal substitution defender and the de-
fender of vicarious punishment; what is at issue between them is whether 
sinful humanity’s suffering the death of its Lord constitutes punishment of 
sinful humanity for its wrongs. So the penal substitution defender cannot 
claim that what Christ’s death made possible was the requital of our ill-des-
ert without our having to undergo a serious deprivation. And, third, it is 
plain that the reasons for gratitude to our Lord for his earthly mission and 
inglorious death may go beyond the gratitude that we owe for the requital 
of our ill-desert. There is, as I said above, no reason to suppose that there is 
not more than one strand to a proper account of the Atonement.
v
Before we turn to the question of vicarious punishment and divine for-
giveness, I want to consider what may seem to be a paradoxical feature of 
the vicarious punishment account of the Atonement. Above (section II) I 
defended vicarious punishment from the charge of inevitable injustice by 
appeal to the consent of the innocent sufferers. I conceded, though, that 
there may well be injustice between the wrongdoer and the suffering in-
nocent, and defended vicarious punishment by noting that the presence of 
such injustice is an inevitable feature of systems of human punishment.31 
But while it seems to me that this response is perfectly acceptable as a de-
fense of the in-principle justifiability of vicarious punishment, it generates 
some difficulties in the case of Christ’s death in the vicarious punishment 
of sinful humanity.
Here is the worry. Suppose that there is a scheme of legal punishment, 
vicarious in character, under which Joanne is made to suffer in order to 
punish Bob for his crime. Because all consent to the scheme, the legal au-
thorities do Joanne no injustice. But Bob may very well have done Joanne 
an injustice. This is not a crucial objection to this scheme of legal pun-
ishment: there may be other legal means of addressing the injustice, or 
it may have been decided, reasonably, that some injustices are not to be 
addressed by the legal system.
31At least, inevitable so long as humans stand in special relationships to other 
humans such that their good is in part constituted by others’ good.
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But things are not so easily resolved under a vicarious punishment 
theory of the Atonement. For I wrong Christ by sinning,32 by making it 
the case that He is to suffer in order that I be punished for my sins. And 
that is a further wrong, for which punishment is called for. So in the very 
functioning of the economy of vicarious punishment in which our ill-
desert is requited, more ill-desert is generated. What is supposed to be 
a desert-requital mechanism turns out to be a mechanism for generating 
more ill-desert.
The problem is not resolved by the fact that Jesus forgives us for this 
wrongdoing, any more than my ill-desert for battering you is dissolved 
by your willingness to forgo any claims in tort for damages. (More on 
this below.) Here we are not focusing on what Jesus is owed from us as a 
result of our wronging him, by way of compensation, apology, etc. We are 
focusing on what we deserve for wronging someone so dramatically. And 
this is just the unhappy situation, that bearing of ill-desert, that vicarious 
punishment is supposed to resolve.
Nor can the problem be resolved, as the problem might be resolved in 
an ordinary legal system, by allowing that not all such wrongs need to be 
answered. For the point of the vicarious punishment account of the Atone-
ment is that the requital of the ill-desert that humanity bears is necessary 
to the proper union with God. To have this ill-desert remaining, because 
generated by, the operations of vicarious punishment would undermine 
the view.
Nor can the problem be resolved by positing that Christ not only con-
sented to be a suffering innocent, thus making the suffering that befell him 
as our punishment not unjustly imposed, but also consented to our caus-
ing him to have to suffer thus in order that we be punished. It’s not only 
that we lack any Scriptural basis for thinking that Christ consented to our 
causing him to have to suffer this way in order that we be adequately pun-
ished for our ill-desert—which contrasts rather sharply with the Scriptural 
basis that we have for Christ’s accepting the suffering death itself. For even 
if we posit such consent, that does not itself preclude the charge that we 
act cruelly when we sin, for we thereby make it the case that only through 
Christ’s suffering will we ourselves be punished for our sins. The charge of 
cruelty, as I argued above (section III), typically requires a global justifica-
tion: it has to be shown that one did not have adequate reason to engage 
in the action that causes another to suffer. But we know that we will not 
be able to justify ourselves here, for the action that causes Christ to have 
to undergo suffering is sin, and we know that we do not have adequate 
reason to sin. So even if it were granted that by sinning we do Jesus no 
injustice, nevertheless we act cruelly, and thereby we add to our sin.
There is, however, a solution to the puzzle. We should claim that the 
operation of vicarious punishment generates an infinite series of vicarious 
punishments and ill-deserts, but it is an infinite regress that is non-vicious, 
as all ill-desert is requited. Christ suffers in order that we be punished for 
our sins. That we have caused Christ to suffer on account of our sins is itself 
32It is, however, necessary that the conditions for culpability are satisfied, in-
cluding importantly one’s knowledge that Christ is to undergo suffering in order 
that one will be punished for one’s sins.
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sinful, and calling for punishment. Christ thus suffers in order that we be 
punished for this sin as well. That we have caused Christ to suffer . . . And 
so on, ad infinitum. While this may look problematic, it seems to me that on 
reflection it is not an unfortunate feature of the view.
Consider the following comparison. Suppose that I owe a sum of 
money that I cannot repay. You pay it on my behalf. I owe you a debt of 
gratitude. You disclaim any such debts. We are now in a similar infinite 
regress. For any disclaiming of a debt of gratitude that you perform, that 
disclaiming will be a praiseworthy, free bestowal of a benefit on me. Thus 
I will owe you further gratitude, which is in turn disclaimed by you. What 
prevents this regress from being vicious, I suggest, is that there is a single 
normative stopper that precludes future such debts from taking hold, that 
is, your waiving any such debts. Similarly, if by divine institution God 
establishes vicarious punishment for all of our sins through the suffering 
death of Christ, then any such sins, including those realized through the 
punishing, can be borne through that suffering death and the vicarious 
punishment that results from it.
vI
A vicarious punishment theory of the Atonement need not deny the desir-
ability, even the need, for an account of divine forgiveness. Yet there are 
some who would wonder whether a vicarious punishment theory is even 
compatible with an emphasis on divine forgiveness. How can a view that 
emphasizes the desirability of retribution imposed through Christ’s suf-
fering death also emphasize the need for divine forgiveness?
There are some senses of divine forgiveness that are incompatible with 
the vicarious punishment account, but in my view, they are not senses of 
divine forgiveness that we should be particularly anxious to preserve. One 
might claim, for example, that an appeal to vicarious punishment ignores 
the possibility that our ill-desert could be dealt with by God in the way 
that an executive’s power of pardon deals with the ill-desert of an offender 
under a legal system: that ill-desert, the liability to punishment, can under 
some constitutions be eliminated by executive prerogative. Wolterstorff 
describes this as a sort of forgiveness, an official sort, carried out through 
declarative speech-acts.33 The notion that God forgives us could be inter-
preted as God’s pardoning us for our offenses,34 thus rendering vicarious 
33See Nicholas Wolterstorff, “Does Forgiveness Undermine Justice?,” in God and 
the ethics of Belief, ed. Andrew Dole and Andrew Chignell (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), pp. 219–247. I found illuminating Adam Pelser’s criticism 
of Wolterstorff’s paper in his “Does Punishment Preclude Forgiveness?” (unpub-
lished manuscript).
34I think this sort of pardon is poorly characterized as forgiveness. (Pelser points 
out the divergence in terms of the attitudes that need to be manifested; see “Does 
Punishment Preclude Forgiveness?”) It is important that in pardons the person 
wronged is not typically the one who is doing the forgiving. Even if we treat this 
person as a representative of the state, it is wrong to think that we wrong the state 
generally when we violate the law in the same way that we wrong our fellow 
citizens, or even the way that we wrong the state under specific legal norms, e.g., 
norms regarding treason.
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punishment unnecessary (and as a result, cruel). After all, if human execu-
tive officials can employ the pardon power to release from ill-desert, then 
a fortiori God should be able to.
But this appeal to the power of pardoning as a way of God’s releasing us 
from ill-desert is a bad idea, for two reasons. First, the reason that the par-
don power in law is capable of releasing from ill-desert is that legal guilt is 
conventional, and so there is nothing to bar there being a legal rule under 
which those who are criminally liable can be, at will, released from their 
liability by executive intervention. But it is a large commitment to take on 
the view that moral ill-desert, which is what is at issue in the case of the 
Atonement, is conventional in that sense. If the divine law is either not a 
function of the divine will, or, if a function of the divine will, nevertheless 
necessary in some of its aspects, then moral guilt is not like legal guilt in 
the relevant sense, and so the a fortiori reasoning will not go through.
Second, even if God does have the power to simply pardon, we need 
an explanation as to what are those goods in terms of which God would 
exercise this power. For our ordinary experience of pardon is that it is 
a lesser evil—it is properly employed when the typical and appropriate 
ways of dealing with a wrongdoer have gone awry, or when the goods 
of punishing are in a particular case to be put to the side for the sake of 
more important goods. We can be confident that in the case of humanity’s 
failings before the divine law, the divine law has not gone astray, nor has 
God’s assessment of us as having failed before it missed the mark. So we 
must appeal to these rival goods. But what are they? They must be some 
goods that are blocked by carrying out punishment on those who bear 
ill-desert. But I don’t know what these goods are supposed to be. We are 
supposed to be concerned here about the possibility here of unity with 
God. How is that unity blocked by God’s punishing us righteously for 
our sins? That we are going to resent it? That looks like our problem, to be 
dealt with through sanctification, rather than by forgoing the retribution 
that we deserve.
So, it is true that an appeal to divine forgiveness as divine pardon is 
incompatible with the vicarious punishment account, but I do not see that 
this is a problem for the vicarious punishment account, for we should not 
be happy with a view on which God simply pardons us for our trans-
gressions of divine law. But there could still be, indeed must be, a place 
for divine forgiveness within a theory of the Atonement. For it is by no 
means the case that being punished for our sins is sufficient to remove the 
obstacles to union with God, and it seems very plausible that forgiveness 
is a necessary part of the removal of these obstacles.
Consider the distinction between criminal law and tort law. Criminal 
law involves norms the violation of which is answered by punishment, 
and tort law involves norms the violation of which is answered by com-
pensation. (Thus the idea of a victimless crime, regardless of whether it 
is morally defensible, is perfectly coherent; the idea of a victimless tort is 
incoherent, for with a tort there is always a harmed party, someone whose 
loss of well-being needs to be compensated.) The same actions can be 
crimes and torts, and having one’s action dealt with under the system of 
criminal law does not at all make recourse under tort law less desirable or 
less accessible (and vice versa). Battery, for example, is a crime and a tort. 
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If you beat and injure me, you are subject to criminal prosecution by the 
state. But you are not free from legal liability simply by undergoing pun-
ishment. For in addition to the criminal liability you bear for hurting me, 
you also bear liability to me, personally, to compensate for my injuries. I 
could sue you, requiring you to pay damages; upon payment of damages, 
you would be free of legal liability—all would be right between you and 
me. But here is another way all could be right: I could waive the right to 
demand damages, freeing you from liability. The crucial point is that these 
are independent liabilities—one to punishment, one to compensation—
and being freed from liability in one respect does not entail being freed 
from liability in the other respect.
Attending to this distinction between crime and tort can enable us to 
see how forgiveness could have an essential role even in a theory of the 
Atonement in which vicarious punishment has a central place. Sinful hu-
manity bears ill-desert for crimes against divine law, and vicarious pun-
ishment could well be the way that God has instituted for that ill-desert to 
be requited. But sinful humanity has also, under the divine law, wronged 
God. What could we do, though, to make right, to undo, the wrong that 
we have done, to compensate for these failures? After all, everything that 
we have is God’s; no compensation seems possible.35 We will either remain 
at odds with God for our failures, punished though we may be, or be 
forgiven for our sins. So not only can one coherently claim that a vicarious 
punishment view of the Atonement is compatible with a role for divine 
forgiveness, one can coherently claim that a vicarious punishment view 
can be completed only when it includes a role for divine forgiveness.36
Georgetown university
35This is what drives Anselm toward his own particular account of the incarna-
tion in Cur Deus Homo: as he writes, “Even when I am not in the state of sin, I owe 
Him myself and whatever I can do, in order to avoid sinning, I have nothing to 
offer Him in compensation for sin” (I, 20). These considerations in favor of God 
incarnate playing this role in the Atonement are also central to Swinburne’s ac-
count, though without the necessity that Anselm ascribes to them (Responsibility 
and Atonement, pp. 157–162).
36For comments on earlier drafts of this paper I owe thanks to Steve Porter, 
Trenton Merricks, Alex Pruss, Tom Flint, and two anonymous referees at Faith and 
Philosophy. I also owe thanks to my fall 2007 and fall 2008 Philosophical Reflec-
tions on the Christian Creeds classes at Georgetown University, whose skeptical 
thoughts on penal substitution were extremely valuable to me.
